CASE LAW

BIA’s Decision in Matter of Thakker

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September 20, 2024, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision in Matter of THAKKER, 28 I&N Dec. 843 (BIA 2024). Matter of Jurado, 24 I&N Dec. 29 (BIA 2006), aff’d sub. nom. Jurado-Delgado v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 498 F. App’x 107 (3d Cir. 2009), overruled in part. In Matter of Thakker, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed whether convictions for retail theft under r retail theft under section 3929(a)(1) of title 18 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes qualified as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for immigration purposes rendering the Respondent removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2024). The BIA ultimately concluded that those convictions were not CIMTs. The BIA began by recognizing the long-held principle that theft offenses are only considered CIMTs if they involve an intent to permanently deprive the owner of their property, citing to Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga. The BIA acknowledged that its prior decision in Matter of Jurado had established an assumption that retail theft offenses inherently included this intent to permanently deprive. However, the BIA determined that this assumption, which stemmed from a desire to distinguish between significant and minor property deprivations, was incompatible with the categorical approach established by the Supreme Court in Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013). The categorical approach dictates that the BIA must focus solely on the elements of the crime as defined by the statute of conviction, rather than on the specific facts of the case. The BIA then examined the relevant Pennsylvania retail theft statute at issue in Matter of Thakker and found that it did not explicitly require an intent to permanently deprive as an element of the offense. Since the statute lacked this essential element, the BIA held that convictions under this statute could not be categorically classified as CIMTs. The BIA distinguished this case from its prior decision in Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, where it found that shoplifting under a specific Arizona statute was categorically a CIMT. The BIA highlighted that the Arizona statute defined “deprive” in a way that encompassed an intent to permanently deprive, unlike the Pennsylvania statute. The BIA concluded that Matter of Jurado needed to be partially overruled because its assumption regarding intent to permanently deprive in retail theft cases conflicted with the categorical approach mandated by the Supreme Court. This decision emphasizes the BIA’s obligation to adhere to the categorical approach when determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude for immigration consequences. The BIA clarified that it cannot rely on assumptions about criminal intent that are not explicitly stated within the elements of the offense outlined in the relevant statute. The Respondent’s convictions for retail theft under section 3929(a)(1) of title 18 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, all of which predate the Board’s decision in Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016), are categorically not for crimes involving moral turpitude because the statute does not require an intent to permanently deprive the victim of property. 

Department of State v. Muñoz

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no right to marriage

In State Department v. Muñoz, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against a U.S. citizen who said her constitutional rights were violated by the federal government when it denied a visa to her Salvadoran husband. Munoz and her husband, who she married in 2010 and has a child with, have been separated since 2015 while they were going through the visa process. After several interviews, a consular officer denied Asencio-Cordero’s application, citing a provision that renders inadmissible a noncitizen whom the officer believes seeks to engage in unlawful activity. Asencio-Cordero and Muñoz sued the Department of State, claiming that it had abridged Muñoz’s constitutional liberty interest in her husband’s visa application by failing to give a sufficient reason why Asencio-Cordero is inadmissible under the “unlawful activity” bar, because the consulate did not provide any further explanation for the decision. Visa denials are not reviewable in court unless the government violates an applicant’s constitutional rights in the process.The Supreme Court on Friday rejected Munoz’s claim that the delay in explaining the denial violated her due process rights by interfering with her fundamental right to marry. The claim “involves more than marriage and more than spousal cohabitation — it includes the right to have her noncitizen husband enter (and remain in) the United States,” Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote for the court. Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson) wrote, “There is no question that excluding a citizen’s spouse burdens her right to marriage, and that burden requires the Government to provide at least a factual basis for its decision.”

Matter of H. N. Ferreira, 28 I&N Dec. 765 (BIA 2023)

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Given the significance of a respondent’s interest in securing review of a denial of a petition to remove the conditions on permanent residence, an Immigration Judge should ordinarily review the denial of a Form I-751 upon the request of the respondent. [Full Decision] Matter of H. N. Ferreira, 28 I&N Dec. 765 (BIA 2023) At a 2019 hearing before the Immigration Judge, DHS indicated that it did not have the respondent’s file and sought a continuance to locate it. The respondent did not object but asked that the proceedings move forward as quickly as possible to obtain review of USCIS’ decision denying his most recent I-751 petition to remove the conditions on his residence. The Immigration Judge continued the case for one month. At the next hearing, DHS still had not located the respondent’s file. The Immigration Judge asked the DHS attorney if she was moving to terminate for failure to prosecute the case, and the DHS attorney indicated that she was. The respondent objected on the grounds that the government “can only move for dismissal on enumerated grounds . . . [a]nd failure to find its file is not one of them.” Matter of H. N. Ferreira, 28 I&N Dec. 765 (BIA 2023) The respondent objected on the grounds that the government “can only move for dismissal on enumerated grounds . . . [a]nd failure to find its file is not one of them.” The respondent also contended that terminating removal proceedings would leave him without an avenue for review of USCIS’ denial of his Form I-751, which at that point he had been seeking for nearly a decade. The Immigration Judge granted DHS’ motion to terminate the removal proceedings on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction tointerfere with DHS’ prosecutorial discretion. The respondent timely appealed. The Board found that Congress has provided that a decision by USCIS to terminate anoncitizen’s conditional permanent resident status is reviewable in removal proceedings by the Immigration Judge. See INA § 216(b)(2), (c)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(2), (c)(3)(D). Under current regulations, this is the only permitted avenue for review. See 8 C.F.R. § 1216.3(a); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (2023) (“No appeal shall lie from the decision of the director [to deny a waiver of the joint filing requirement]; however, the alien may seek review of such decision in removal proceedings.”). Where the basis for USCIS’ denial of a Form I-751 petition is the denial of a waiver of the joint filing requirement, the Immigration Judge reviews the denial of the waiver as well. See 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f); Matter of Bador, 28 I&N Dec. at 642 (collecting authority); see also Matter of Herrera Del Orden, 25 I&N Dec. 589, 593–95 (BIA 2011) (discussing the scope of the Immigration Judge’s review of the denial of an applicant’s request for a waiver of the joint filing requirement). Because DHS does not have unilateral authority to cancel a Notice to Appear once removal proceedings have commenced, DHS’ motion to terminate constituted a request that the Immigration Judge exercise his authority to terminate the proceedings. See Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. at 284. The Immigration Judge has authority to adjudicate this request “based on an evaluation of the factors underlying the [DHS’] motion.” Id. The Immigration Judge erred in concluding that he was required to terminate proceedings simply because DHS had moved to do so. Instead, the Immigration Judge should have adjudicated the motion after considering the underlying facts and circumstances. Because the Immigration Judge mistakenly concluded that DHS’ motion divested him of jurisdiction, he did not consider the respondent’s interest in obtaining review of USCIS’ denial of his Form I-751 petition. The respondent’s interest in having an Immigration Judge review USCIS’ denial of a Form I-751 is significant. Regulations provide that when USCIS terminates conditional permanent resident status by denying a Form I-751, there is no appeal from that decision to any higher authority within USCIS, and the noncitizen must be placed in removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1216.3(a). At that point, the denial of the Form I-751, and any associated waivers, is reviewable only by the Immigration Judge. See INA § 216(b)(2), (c)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(2), (c)(3)(D); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1216.3(a), 1216.5(f); Matter of Bador, 28 I&N Dec. at 642. The appeal was sustained and the case was remanded to the Immigration Judge to review the Respondent’s petition to remove conditions on his residency. See full decision here.

Respondent With A Pending Appeal of a Criminal Conviction Does Not Have a Criminal Conviction

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The Board of Immigration Appeals published a decision holding that when a respondent has a pending appeal under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law the criminal conviction his not yet final and therefore the respondent has not been “convicted” as defined by INA §1101(a)(48)(A). Matter of Brathwaite Matter of Brathwaite, 28 I&N Dec. 751 (BIA 2023) The respondent filed a motion to terminate his removal proceedings. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the motion. The Immigration Judge had denied the motion and found the respondent removable and the Board had originally affirmed. The Board of Immigration Appeals was remanded the case by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to determine the finality of the respondent’s criminal convictions under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2018), and to reassess whether heis removable as charged. Brathwaite v. Garland, 3 F.4th 542 (2d Cir. 2021). Facts of the Case The respondent is a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. DHS served the respondent with a notice to appear alleging that on January 31, 2018, he was convicted of multiple offenses including identity theft, larceny, and possession of stolen property in violation of New York law. DHS charged the respondent with removability under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii) (2018), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and an aggravated felony, respectively. The respondent filed a motion to terminate, arguing that his convictions were not final for immigration purposes under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), because a New York court had granted his motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. The Board’s Decision Pursuant to the Board’s interpretation of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), as affirmed by the Second Circuit, a conviction does not support removability until it is final, meaning that the right to direct appellate review has been waived or exhausted. See Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 552–53 (affirming the Board’s conclusion in Matter of J. M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. at 431, that in enacting section 101(a)(48)(A), Congress intended to incorporate the finality rule of Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (BIA 1988)). Determining whether direct appellate review has been waived or exhausted requires analysis under the criminal procedure laws of the convicting State. Despite reversing the rule in Matter of J. M. Acosta, the Second Circuit did not reach whether other limits on finality relating to a request for a late-filed appeal under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law might be imposed. See Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 553–54. The BIA recognized DHS’ concerns about delays in the New York criminal process and differing outcomes nationally depending on the criminal procedure statutes in different States. However, the Board found that DHS’ proposal is at odds with the court’s explanation of New York’s appellate process set forth in Brathwaite v. Garland. The Second Circuit clearly stated that a motion to file a late notice of appeal under section 460.30, once accepted by the New York court, is deemed the equivalent of a timely-filed direct appeal. Id. The Board found no authority supporting a qualification on the characteristics of a direct appeal as of right. A motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal “must be made with due diligence after the time for the taking of such appeal has expired.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.30(1) (McKinney 2019). A New York court that has granted such a motion has therefore necessarily concluded that the defendant proceeded with due diligence, even if the motion was filed the maximum 1 year and 30 days after the conviction. We cannot substitute our judgment in that regard. In removal proceedings, DHS has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that a respondent who has been admitted to the United States is deportable. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (2023); accord Matter of Thomas and Thompson, 27 I&N Dec. 674, 690 (A.G. 2019). Thus, because an appeal accepted under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law is classified as a direct appeal, a respondent with a pending appeal under this section does not have a final conviction for immigration purposes. NOTE The BIA’s analysis applies only to section 460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law based on its classification as a direct appeal of right under controlling precedent. Such an appeal is distinct from discretionary appeals beyond the first appeal of right in New York. See generally N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 450.90, 460.10(5), 460.20 (McKinney 2023). Full Decision

Important Update on Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

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On Sept. 13, 2023, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a decision finding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Final Rule unlawful and expanding the original July 16, 2021 injunction and order of vacatur to cover the Final Rule. However, the court maintained a partial stay of the order for “all DACA recipients who received their initial DACA status prior to July 16, 2021.” See the Memorandum and Order (PDF, 1.35 MB) and Supplemental Order of Injunction (PDF, 72.53 KB). Current grants of DACA and related Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) remain valid until they expire, unless individually terminated. USCIS will continue to accept and process DACA renewal requests and accompanying applications for employment authorization under the DACA regulations at 8 CFR 236.22 and 236.23, as it has since October 31, 2022, in accordance with this decision. USCIS will continue to accept initial requests, but per the order, not process initial DACA requests. Currently valid grants of DACA and related EADs will continue to be recognized as valid under the Final Rule. This means that individuals with DACA and related EADs do not have to submit a request for DACA or employment authorization until the appropriate time to seek renewal. For more information on DACA, please visit our USCIS DACA webpage.